I investigate the link between business regulatory reforms and economic growth in 172 countries.
Introduction
The World Bank has been publishing the annual Doing Business reports since 2004 to investigate the scope and manner of regulations that enhance business activity and those that constrain it. These reports compare countries 2 The authors look at the regulatory status at one year but this paper considers a more interesting and important variable, regulatory reform (not status) at a given year and over time.
They consider that growth is a function of the existing regulatory framework. I argue that the level of income can be a function of existing regulatory framework but a change in income level is more of a function of how regulatory framework changes and improves.
This paper uses the World Bank Doing Business indicators as proxies of business regulations, identifies business regulatory reforms by Doing Business reforms, and goes further towards answering the question about whether regulatory reforms enhance economic growth by studying a major determinant of economic growth: regulatory reforms governing business activity.
A vibrant private sector -with firms making investments, creating jobs, and improving productivity -promotes growth and expands opportunities for poor people (OECD and World
Bank (2006)). To strengthen private sector, governments around the world have implemented wide-ranging reforms, including macro-stabilization programs, price liberalization, privatization, and trade-barrier reductions. In many countries, however, entrepreneurial activity remains limited, poverty stays high, and growth is not significantly far from stagnant. And other countries have spurned orthodox macro reforms and done well.
Although macro policies are unquestionably important, there is a growing consensus that the quality of business regulation and the institutions that enforce it are a major determinant of prosperity. Hong Kong (China)'s economic success, Botswana's stellar growth performance, and
Hungary's smooth transition experience have all been stimulated by a good business regulatory environment 3 . However, little research has measured specific aspects of business regulation and analyzed their impact on economic outcomes such as growth, productivity, investment, informality, corruption, unemployment, and poverty. The lack of systematic knowledge prevents policymakers from assessing how good legal and regulatory systems are and determining what to reform.
The World Bank Doing Business regulatory indicators have four key goals. First, they aim to motivate reforms through country benchmarking. Second, they try to inform the design of reforms by highlighting specifically what needs to be changed. Third, the dataset enriches international initiatives on development effectiveness. Fourth, the dataset tries to inform theory 3 See the World Bank Doing Business 2004 report for details.
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by producing new indicators that quantify various aspects of regulation, facilitating tests of existing theories, and contributing to the empirical foundation for new theoretical work on the relation between regulation and development.
Governments around the world reported 1140 business regulatory reforms over the five years up to 2010 4 . Against the backdrop of the global financial and economic crisis, policy makers around the world continue to reform business regulations at the level of the firm, in some areas at an even faster pace than before. Most reforms were nested in broader programs of investment climate reform aimed at enhancing economic competitiveness, as in Colombia, Kenya, and
Liberia. In structuring their reform programs for the business environment, governments use multiple data sources and indicators. And, reformers respond to many stakeholders and interest groups, all of whom bring important issues and concerns to the debate. World Bank Group dialogue with governments on the investment climate is designed to encourage critical use of the data, sharpen judgment, avoid a narrow focus on improving rankings, and encourage broadbased reforms that enhance the investment climate. These continued efforts prompt questions:
What is the impact of business regulatory reforms on economic growth? This paper aims to present new findings toward answering this question.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews literature. Section 3 describes data. Section 4 presents main empirical results. Section 5 provides robustness checks, and section 6 concludes. 
Literature review:
Hall and Jones (1999), Acemoglu et al (2001) , Djankov et al (2002 Djankov et al ( , 2003 Djankov et al ( , 2004 Djankov et al ( , and 2006 , among others 5 , show that institutions are a major determinant of wealth and long-term growth.
Countries that had better political and economic institutions in the past are richer today. I add to the literature on institutions and growth by studying a new measure of institutional reforms. The analysis focuses on a particular type of institutional reforms: business regulations. I use a new country-level data set to establish the impact of business regulatory reforms on economic growth.
The relationship between regulations and business activity has been under investigation in many academic circles in many articles over the last two decades. Winston (1998) provides a literature review, finds that business regulations affect large and most concentrated industries and are sector-specific. However, much fewer studies look at the impact of business regulatory reforms on economic growth, partly due to lack of data availability. This study tries to fill a research gap by addressing business regulatory reforms impact on economic growth.
Various empirical studies look at business regulations trends across countries over the last decade. Djankov et al (2002) and find that each additional day that a product is delayed prior to being shipped reduces trade by more than one percent. The results that I establish in this paper (in the main regressions and in Appendix Table A8 ) are related to the latter paper. Appendix Table A8 shows that each positive reform in trading-across-borders regulations (i.e. time, costs, and procedures needed to export or import a cargo) is associated with a 0.88% increase in average economic growth rate. Thus, this paper also highlights the importance of reducing trade costs (as opposed to tariff barriers) to stimulate economic growth. 
Data description
The sample consists of 172 countries for which information on the main variables is available. Business data as I consider that it offers two advantages. First, unlike other data sources that are based in part on experts' perceptions, the Doing Business data are based on actual reforms.
Second, and more important, since the Doing Business data cover a specific set of policy reforms, reverse causality from the dependent variable to reform is unlikely. It is difficult, for example, to imagine that the enactment of higher growth rates leads to more efficient bankruptcy law and, hence, would influence the societal bend towards reform. In contrast, other available This is a large effect given that the mean value of the dependent variable is only 3.93.
Main empirical results
The estimated coefficient of the Reform variable remains large and statistically significant when I control for various proxies of institutions and economic variables (columns 2-10). The coefficient value is lowest when I control for corruption, equaling 0.114 significant at the 5% level (column 10). Controlling for foreign direct investment and fixed capital formation growth lowers the estimated coefficient of reform but keeps it statistically significant at the 1% level (columns 2 and 3). In addition, the estimated coefficient value of Reform remains positive, economically large and statistically significant at less than the 5 percent level even after controlling for population size and trade openness (columns 4 and 5). However, the coefficient value does decline in magnitude from 0.150 (column 1) to 0.128 (column 5). This decline is almost entirely due to the control for foreign direct investment and trade. These two measures are negatively correlated with Growth.
Given that controlling for trade and investment levels had a fairly large effect on the estimated coefficient value of Reform, controlling for government expenditures and financial freedom, additional measures of overall financial development becomes more important. expecting that countries with higher levels of financial freedom would enjoy higher growth rates.
Nevertheless, the sample period includes a financial crises time span, which affected more sharply countries with higher levels of financial freedom and more developed systems. Sure, other factors caused these countries (i.e. US, EU) to have lower growth rates too. This is why I do not consider the result as surprising in this particular context. More importantly, the result does not contradict my expectations given the main independent variable does not capture financial freedom.
Reasonably, countries of more political stability, rule of law, and control of corruption need less business regulatory reforms, as also exhibited in Table 3 . The largest impact on the estimated coefficient of Reform occurs when I control for corruption. It decreases from 0.150 (column1) to 0.114 (significant at the 1% level) due to the control of corruption (column 10).
Importantly, the estimated coefficient value of Reform holds in terms of economic magnitude and remains statistically significant after controlling for each of the above economic variables.
In sum, growth is associated with micro-economic reforms, and this association remains strong when I control for various measures of institutional quality and economic variables. One concern with the results discussed above could be statistical significance. That is, while the magnitude of the estimated coefficient of Reform is not much affected by the various controls, its statistical significance level goes down to from 1 to 5 percent once I control for population, trade, and corruption. Does this mean that the results for the Growth-Reform relationship are somewhat weak? It is not necessarily the case because a 5 percent significance level is not necessarily weak. The next section shows that the results hold even after I allow a lagged impact of reform on growth. Hence, the stated weakness appears to be due to a specification bias. This matter makes the focus on the lagged impact much more important.
Robustness
I repeat the regression exercise using lagged reforms as well as country fixed effects estimators.
The relationship between reforms and growth holds (Table 5) . Unlike above, it is stronger in economic magnitude and still significant at the 5 and 10 % levels when I control for FDI, population, and corruption. Based on the estimated coefficients, one additional business regulatory reform in a given country during 2006-08 is associated, on average, with a 0.18% increase in its economic growth during 2009-10.
Unlike other studies that do not go beyond whether a country reformed/not reformed or beyond counting the regulatory reforms, I consider the timing of reforms at the country-year level for two reasons. First, the availability of sequential reform information at the country level allows me to control for idiosyncratic patterns in the economic growth variable at the country level. Then, I do not worry about estimation bias due to unobserved controls that may drive differences in growth rates and are invariant during the sample period. Second, it helps me to partial out unobserved non-varying heterogeneity. For example, the fixed effects estimators that I use are valid in cases where economies with less flexible regulatory frameworks intervene more in their markets via the channel of state owned enterprises conditional on that such trends are time invariant.
Another worrisome zone is the co-movement of macroeconomic variables. If the timing of reforms is correlated with the business cycle, then the main regression in Table 5 will deliver biased coefficient estimates. And, in fact, such correlation can happen as output rates follow persistent, cyclical processes with substantial autocorrelation. One example can be when reforms take places during periods of prosperity. Then, the macroeconomic indicators move downward with the business cycles, causing the coefficients on reforms in Table 5 to be downward-biased.
Another example can be when business regulatory reforms are motivated by and implemented control for other institutional variables to address this potential problem. (column 1, Table 5 ). I controlled for all the variables reported in Table 4 simultaneously. The relationship between growth and reform remains robust to all these checks. The hypothesis that I propose in the introduction -that business regulatory reforms have a positive impact on economic growth -cannot be rejected. The analysis shows that the p-values on business regulatory reform coefficients are statistically significant at conventional levels, and the confidence intervals widen substantially after including controls. I tried various ways to increase power by reducing multi-collinearity -i.e. by measuring the impact of reforms in each separate business regulatory area as well as by dropping controls -but the positive impact of business regulatory reforms holds.
Conclusion
With business regulatory reforms expanding significantly within countries and are being used as In addition, the onset of the global economic crisis has led to a slump in global economic growth. However, the extent to which economic growth has decreased differed among countries All standard errors used are Huber-White robust and clustered on the country. All regressions use a constant term (not shown). Significance level is denoted by ***(1 percent or less), **(5 percent or less) and *(10 percent or less). Significance level is denoted by ***(1 percent or less), **(5 percent or less) and *(10 percent or less). All standard errors used are Huber-White robust and clustered on the country. All regressions use a constant term (not shown). Significance level is denoted by ***(1 percent or less), **(5 percent or less) and *(10 percent or less). Significance level is denoted by ***(1 percent or less), **(5 percent or less) and *(10 percent or less). Significance level is denoted by ***(1 percent or less), **(5 percent or less) and *(10 percent or less). Significance level is denoted by ***(1 percent or less), **(5 percent or less) and *(10 percent or less). All standard errors used are Huber-White robust and clustered on the country. All regressions use a constant term (not shown). Significance level is denoted by ***(1 percent or less), **(5 percent or less) and *(10 percent or less). All standard errors used are Huber-White robust and clustered on the country. All regressions use a constant term (not shown). Significance level is denoted by ***(1 percent or less), **(5 percent or less) and *(10 percent or less). All standard errors used are Huber-White robust and clustered on the country. All regressions use a constant term (not shown). Significance level is denoted by ***(1 percent or less), **(5 percent or less) and *(10 percent or less). All standard errors used are Huber-White robust and clustered on the country. All regressions use a constant term (not shown). Significance level is denoted by ***(1 percent or less), **(5 percent or less) and *(10 percent or less).
